This paper evaluated the security of SIMECK using the algebraic fault analysis. Firstly, it gave the method of creating equivalent algebraic equations of SIMECK encryption round function and key generation strategy. Secondly, it designed the known fault model and stochastic fault model respectively, and proposed two strategies based on the differential value of fault injected and the fault index determined by differential value of ciphertext to create equivalent equations of fault information under the unknown model. Finally, it solved equations based on the SAT problem. Experimental results show that after injecting single-bit fault to the 24th round of SIMECK32/64, the fault known model and the fault unknown model based on differential value of the fault injection, only 2 injections can recover the full 64 bit master keys. And 9 injections needed for the fault unknown model based on the differential value of ciphertext after injecting single-bit fault to the 27th round. The method's complexity of searching key is simpler and its fault injection sample required is less compared with the previous research.

[2019-07-05] Printed Article /doc/2018.01.0096/v2